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Companies in industrialized countries use a wide variety of approaches to adjust their
workforce levels in response to changes in product demand and technology. Although approaches to
workforce reduction vary within countries according to the industry and skill level of the workforce,
large, systematic differences exist across countries. In general, American companies, whose workers
have relatively weak job security, rely extensively on layoffs to effect reductions in force. Companies
in some European countries and in Japan, whose workers enjoy strong job protection, rely more on
alternatives to layoffs, including work sharing arrangements, attrition, and early retirement.
In this paper, I compare labor adjustment practices in European countries, Japan, and the
United States; discuss the role that public policies play in influencing the adjustment process; and
review evidence on the efficacy of different approaches to labor adjustment. I begin by discussing
public policies in Europe, Japan, and the United States that are likely to have a significant impact on
labor adjustment practices. Employment protection laws are reviewed in section I and short-time
compensation and early retiremem programs are described in section II. While many European
countries and Japan heavily regulate layoffs. they facilitate the use of alternatives through programs
that subsidize the pay of workers on short time and programs that subsidize early retirement.
Companies' use of temporary. part-time, or contract workers to increase employment flexibility
is discussed in section III. Companies may use these workers, who usually are not covered by
employment protection laws. to buffer their core workforce against fluctuations in product demand.
These fonus of employment have been rapidly expanding in many countries. and I review evidence that
this growth may be partly attributed to employer demand for greater employment flexibility.
Evidence on the effects of employment protection laws and employment adjustment practices
have on the operation of labor m·arkets is reviewed in section IV . Opponents of labor market
regulations fear that they will inhibit finns ' ability to adjust to downturns and that they will raise
unemployment by making firm s reluctant to hire new workers . The evidence on these issues is mixed .

There is no simple correlation between the stringency of dismissal regulations and the unemployment
rate. Moreover, in at least some countries where regulations on dismissals are accompanied by liberal
short-time compensation programs, companies are able to compensate for the sluggish employment
adjustment by adjusting average hours per worker more in the short run.
The efficiency of different labor adjustment strategies is discussed in the final section of the
paper.

I.

Employment Protection Laws
The degree of govenunent regulation of dismissals varies greatly across countries.

Goverrunent regulation of dismissals is most stringent in European countries. European countries
generally require that employers provide workers

wi~

some period of notice prior to dismissal, that

they provide compensation to laid-off workers under certain circumstances, and that they take
additional steps in the event of a mass layoff. Although Japan requires that companies provide workers
with notice prior to dismissal , Japanese dismissal legislation is less stringent than that in most European
countries, leading many to conclude that it is legally easier to layoff workers in Japan than in Europe.
However, Japanese courts have extended strong job protection to core workers, thus making it
extremely difficult for companies to layoff pennanent, full-time employees. In contrast to the siruation
in Europe and Japan, employers in the United States still have the right, for the most part, to hire and
fire workers at will.
Opponents of employment protection laws claim that because they impose costs on finns, finns
will be reluctant to hire new workers. thereby raising unemployment. It is also feared that such laws
will encourage finns to hire more casual workers, such as temporary and part-time workers, who may
not be covered by the legislation, thus leading to a highly segmented market characterized by protected
and unprotected workers .
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Proponents of employment protection laws have justified them on several grounds. They have
been viewed as a vehicle for deterring unfair dismissal, thus promoting equity, and as a vehicle for
providing labor with more clout. thus correcting a perceived imbalance in power between employers
and workers. Moreover, proponents have argued that various market imperfections are likely to exist,
warranting some govenunent regulation . For example, because workers and employers are unlikely
take into account the full costs of layoffs on a communi£y, too many layoffs occur, justifying some
government regulation to deter excess reductions in force . In addition, because employers are likely to
have better infonnation than workers about the probability and timing of layoffs and are likely to have
incentives to withhold this information from workers, some govenunent regulation is justified to correct
this asymmetry in infonnation and promote efficient labor market transactions. I
Below I discuss key provisions of employment protection laws in various European countries ,
Japan, and [he United States. Table 1 summarizes selected"provisions in these countries.
Europe
Most European countries require that dismissals be justified on social or economic grounds.
All countries also require that employers provide workers with notice prior to dismissal, except in cases
where the individual is dismissed for serious misconduct. The amount of mandatory notice varies with
an individual's tenure with the company. and, in some countries, according to whether an individual is
a blue-collar or white-collar worker. For example, in Germany mandatory notice periods for
individuals vary from two weeks to six months, depending upon a worker's seniority and age. In
France , employers must provide one month's notice for workers with at least six months' service, two
months' notice for workers with at least two years' service, and three months' notice for persons in
middle management positions.

IOECD (1986) and Houseman (1990) contain expanded discussions of the arguments for and
against employment protection laws.
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Table I
Summary of Selected Provisions of Dismissal Law in Europe, Japan, and the United Siaies

GermanY
SOCIal or economic
Justification of dl~mlssal
requlrcd
Period of nollce 10
mdlvlduals

aff~cted

BeiejUID

y"

2 weeks - 6 months, depending
on seniority

1-2 months, depending on
seniority
middle management:
3 months

No

Blue collar:
28-56 days, depending on
seniority

Only through case law

No

1-12 weeks, depending on
seniority

Legislated maximum of one
month's nolice

No general
nolification
requirements

While collar:
3 months per new period of 5
years seniority and longer for
highly paid employees

Ocfmulon of Collecllve
DIsmIssal

Approximately 20% of work
force over a 30-<lay penod,
deperKhng on estabhsluneru
size

2 or more employees over a
3()-.day period. More stringent
rcgulalions apply if 10 or more
dismissed

Appro~imately 10% of work
force oyer a 6O-day period,
depending on establishmenl
size

Approximately 10% of work
force (30 or more workers in
large establishments) over a
30-day period

More than 30 permanent
regular employees within a
month

Approximalely 1/) of
work force over a 30day period,
depending on
utablishmenl me

NOllce and consultation
requLrements In event of
collective dIsmissal

Obligation to inform and
consult wIth worker
represenlll.uves. Local
employment office must be
Informed of dismissal. May
delay dLsmLssal for up to 2
months

Obligation to inform and
consult with worker
reprcsentatives. Labor
Inspector must be informed of
dismissal of 10 or more
workers and dismissal may
take place only after specified
waiting period.

Obligation 10 inform and
consult with worker
rcpresentltives. Goyernment
must be informed of dismissal.
Waiting period of 30 days
following notification to
goyernment Waiting period
may be extended to 60 days.

Obligation to notify and
consult with trade union
5epusentative and notify
authorities,

Obligation to notify labor
authorities, Negotiation or
consultation with trade unions
usu ally required by courts

Obligation to give
workers and Stafe and
local goverrunenc
officials 60 days
advance nOfice.

SlarutOl)' se,'erancc

No, bm social plan must be
negotiated between works
council and management In
eve nt of a collective dismissal.

flaymenl~

I~bor

No

No

In addition to the above requirements, which apply to all individual dismissals , European labor
law typically requires that employers follow certain other procedures in the event of a mass layoff. For
example, by European Union directive, employers in all EU countries must consult with employee
representatives to discuss possible alternatives to layoffs or measures to alleviate their impact.
Employers in all EU countries also must notify labor market authorities in the event of a mass layoff.
Employers must provide employee representatives and labor market authorities with infonnation
concerning the number and timing of dismissals and the reasons for dismissals, and wait at least 30
days prior to implementing the layoffs. In addition to the infonnation and notification requirements,
administrative approval of mass layoffs is mandated in the Netherlands, Greece, Portugal and Spain.
The definition of a collective dismissal, and hence the threshold triggering these additional
requirements, varies from country to country. A collective dismissal is defined as the dismissal of just
two or more persons over a 30-day period in France. In

G~nnany,

it is approximately 20 percent of

the workforce over a 30-day period, depending on the size of the establishment. In large
establishments, the threshold is the dismissal of 60 or more workers over a 3O-day period. In Belgium,
a collective dismissal is defined as the layoff of approximately 10 percent of the workforce over a 30day period, depending on the size of the establishment.
Many European countries provide for statutory compensation to dismissed workers under
certain circumstances. For example, France requires that employers pay 11 10th of a month's pay per
year of service plus 1/15 of a month's pay for each year over 10 years of service for all individuals
dismissed . The United Kingdom also sets statutory payments for all dismissals for economic reasons .
These severance payments are determined by a formula based on an individual's age and years of
service. Although Gennan law stipulates no statutory compensation to dismissed workers, in cases of
collective dismissal at an establisrunent normally employing more than twenty workers, employers and
works councils must negotiate a social plan that provides for compensation
5
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workers who lose their

job. 2 In the event that the two parties caMot agree on a social plan, the law provides for binding
arbitration. In a sample of social plans negotiated between 1980 and 1985, the median settlement was
between 10.000 and 15,000 OM per recipient, or about 15 to 25 weeks of pay for a person with
average blue-collar earnings (Abraham and Houseman 1993, pp . 21-2).
In addition to regulating dismissals, many European countries regulate employment on ftxedterm contracts. Without such regulation employers could circumvent notice and severance payment
requirements by hiring workers on fIXed-teon contracts and repeatedly renewing these contracts.
Among the twelve European Union countries only three-Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdomimpose no restrictions on the use of fIXed-teon contracts, and these countries have relatively weak
employment protection laws (Commission of the European Communities 1993, p. 176).
A number of European countries have experienced high and persistent unemployment since the
1980's.

Many have argued that regulation, including the regulation of dismissals, has been partly to

blame for the sharp increase in unemployment. In response to pressure from business, governments in
several European countries relaxed restrictions on dismissals and, perhaps more importantly,
liberalized the use of fIXed-term contracts, thus enabling businesses to circumvent dismissal regulations.
In 1986 the French government eliminated the requirement that all dismissals receive government
authorization. Legislation passed in Germany in 1985 significantly reduced restrictions on the use of
fixed-tenn contracts, raised the thresholds defining a collective dismissal, and gave new firms a fouryear exemption from the social plan requirement. The British government extended the qualifying
period for unfair dismissals from 26 weeks to 105 weeks. The governments in Spain and Portugal,

2German works councils are composed of employee representatives and are officially
independent of trade unions .
6

which have among the most stringent regulations on dismissals of permanent employees, liberalized the
use of ftxed-term contracts.l

Japanese statutes provide few restrictions on dismissals . The relevant statutes, while specifying
a period of notice, do not require that the employer give any justification for terminating an individual.
However, a large and complex body of case law governing dismissals has evolved over the years.'
Since the 1950's, the courts have ruled that even when an employer has provided the required notice, it
must have some compelling reason or just cause for dismissing the individual. In practice, courts have
ruled dismissals of individuals invalid unless serious misconduct by the worker is shown. In cases of
economic dismissals, courts have ruled that the employer must take every step to avoid dismissals, such
as eliminating overtime, stopping the recruitment of temporary workers, and transferring workers to
related enterprises. In the event of a mass layoff, defmed as the dismissal of more than 30 workers
within a month, employers must notify labor authorities . Courts also generally require that employers
negotiate or consult with trade unions prior to a mass layoff.
According to Matsuda (1992) court decisions concerning dismissal protection of part-time
workers have been contradictory. Some courts have ruled that during economic downturns part-time
workers should be the first to be dismissed, while others have ruled that objective and social criteria
used to detennine layoffs should be applied equally to full-time and part-time workers. In practice,
however, it is generally understood among management, unions, and workers that part-time workers
have little job security.

)For a more extensive discussion of the changes to employment protection laws in EU
countries, see Commission of the European Communities ( 1993) pp . 177-8 .
. 'The following discussion of dismissal law in Japan draws heavily on
(1992) and Schregle (1993).
7

desc riplion~

in MalSuda

Relative to Americans and Europeans, Japanese resolve few personal disputes through the legal
system.

On~

might conclude from this fact that dismissal law is of limited relevance to what happens in

practice. Schregle (1993), however, argues that the court decisions reflect the strong social value
Japanese place on job security.
As in Europe, Japanese employers may circumvent restrictions on dismissing regular, full-time
employees by hiring workers on temporary contract and repeatedly renewing their contracts. In
contrast to most European countries, Japan places no restrictions on the length of a fiXed-term contract
and the number of times it may be renewed if the temporary worker is hired directly by the company.
However, Japan does regulate the use of workers hired through temporary help agencies. Contracts of
so-called dispatched workers may be renewed only three times . In addition, dispatched workers are
supposed to possess special skills that the company has difficulty fmding in regular workers.
Temporary help agencies, therefore, are only allowed to place workers with certain skills, though the
list of skills is deliberately left quite broad.
The United States
In contrast to the situation in Europe and Japan, there is little regulation of dismissals in the
United States. Advance notice provisions were first enacted into U.S. law in 1988 and took effect in
1989. The law requires that employers give workers and state and local government officials sixty
days' advance notice before a mass layoff or plant closure. A mass layoff is defined as a layoff of at
least one-third of the workforce at a single site over a 3O-day period or a situation in which at least onethird of the workers have their hours reduced by at least 50 percent for six months. At least 50
workers must be affected, and so small establishments are exempted from the advance notice
_requirement. Advance notice requirements also apply if 500 or more workers are affected, even if this
number constirUies less than one third of an establishment's workforce.
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The U.S. advance notice law, which is considerably weaker than advance notice laws found in
Europe and Japan, has had little effect on private sector layoff practices. however. According to a
recent slUdy. three-quarters of all companies that appeared to meet the criteria requiring advance notice
either failed to file notice or gave less than 60 days' notice (U.S. General Accounting Office 1993). In
most cases, then, companies either slip through the law's large loopholes or fail to comply with the
law. Moreover, U.S. law does not require that companies consult with worker representatives prior to
mass layoffs or provide compensation to affected workers-provisions colTUDon in Europe.

n.

Short-Time Work and Early Retirement
Employment protection laws may limit employers' ability to reduce workforce levels during

downlUrns in demand. Even in countries with relatively weak employment protection laws, employers
often try to increase employee commitment by providing workers with explicit or implicit job
guarantees. Companies may reduce labor input wilbout resorting to layoffs by reducing the hours that
workers work or by offering job buyouts or early retirement incentives. Although many countries
discourage layoffs through employment protection laws. they help subsidize the costs of using such
alternatives.
For example. most European countries and Japan offer benefits to workers whose hours of
work have been reduced for economic reasons. Among EU countries. only the United Kingdom does
not offer shorHime benefits. In the United States short-time compensation programs have been
introduced recently by 17 states. ) Although short-time compensation schemes vary from country to
country, in general workers on short time receive pro-rated benefits for the reduction in hours below a

SShort-time compensation programs have not been widely used in the United States in states
where they have been introduced. For a discussion of short-time compensation programs in the United
Siaies. see Abraham and Houseman (1993) .
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specified level. For example, in Germany, where shorHime compensation is part of the unemployment
insurance system, workers receive pro-rated unemployment insurance benefits for the reduction in
hours worked. Employees who, say, work four days per week instead of five receive 80 percent of
their pay plus 20 percent of the unemployment insurance benefit to which they would be entitled if
wholly unemployed. German finns applying for short-time benefits on behalf of their employees must
show that they have taken other measures, such as reducing overtime and rebuilding inventories, to
accommodate the fall in demand. Short-time benefits are payable for up to six months under ordinary
circumstances and for up to twelve months to employees in establishments in depressed industries or
regions.
In France the cost of providing benefits to workers on short time is shared by companies and
the goverrunent. The goverrunent pays out an hourly benefit equal to about 65 percent of the minimum
wage

f~r

reductions in hours below 39 hours per week, and companies, by the terms of a national inter-

industry agreement, raise the short-time benefit amount to 50 percent of the worker's gross wage for
reductions in hours below 36 per week, subject to a ceiling. To encourage the use of short time, the
state typically reimburses the employer for between 50 and 80 percent of the employer's share of the
benefit payment. Benefits may be paid for up to 500 hours per year.
Belgium has one of the most liberal short-time compensation programs. Short-time
compensation benefits are paid by the government from the regular unemployment insurance fund and
replace 55 to 60 percent of a blue-collar worker's net wages. Blue-collar workers may collect benefits
indefinitely provided they work a minimum of three days per week or every other week if on a system
of rotating layoffs and if [he government does not disapprove the payment. Belgian white-collar
workers are guaranteed full pay during slack periods and so generally are not eligible for short-time
benefits.
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Japan also has a quite liberal short-time compensation program. This system , which only
compensates for full days of work stoppage, is generous for workers, who often receive full
compensation for the days they do not work. 6
A company also may effect workforce reductions by lowering the age of retirement. Legal
protection against layoff tends to be the strongest for older workers in European countries, and hence
early retirement measures have been a popular mechanism for reducing workforce levels and opening
up jobs for younger workers. Many European countries have developed programs that help subsidize
the cost of early retirement to companies.
For example, the Gennan govenunent implicitly subsidizes early retirement through the
unemployment insurance system. Workers age 60 who have been unemployed for at least 52 weeks
out of the last year and a half may start receiving their govenunent pension. Under the Gennan
unemployment insurance system, all unemployed workers may receive tax-free benefits that replace
about 68 percent (63 percent for workers with no dependents) of their previous income for one year.
After that period of time unemployment assistance is means tested and qualified individuals receive
benefits at a reduced rate. In the mid-1980 's the unemployment insurance laws were changed to allow
older workers to collect non-means tested unemployment benefits at the higher (68 or 63 percent) rate
for a longer period of time. Under current law persons age 54 and over may collect these
unemployment benefits for 32 months. Companies use this system to help subsidize early retirement by
officially dismissing workers as young as age 57 and 4 months. These workers then receive
unemployment insurance. possibly supplemented by a company payment, for up to thirty-two months,
and at age 60 they may begin receiving their goverrunent pension.

'For descriptions of short-time compensation programs in Europe and Japan see Van
Audenrode (1994) and Abraham and Houseman ( 1994).
II

The practice of early retirement is particularly conunon in Japan. Although large and medium
sized Japanese companies typically provide strong job security for regular workers, they usually
require regular employees to retire early, often as young as age 55. These workers may then be
reemployed as contract workers by their fonner company, without job security, or they may fmd ajob,
usually with a smaller company, at substantially lower wages. By varying the age of early retirement
Japanese companies may increase the employment flexibility of their regular workforce.
Large Japanese companies also conunonly transfer workers from an operation requiring
workforce reductions to a subsidiary operation. This practice became popular during the first oil price
shock in the mid·1970's as a means of avoiding mass layoffs.

Ill.

Core versus Peripheral Workers
Employers can reduce labor input without layoffs by implementing shorHime work schemes,

encouraging older workers to retire early, and transferring excess workers to subsidiary operations or
to positions vacated by those who retire or quit. Employers also may chose to maintain job security for
only a core set of workers and layoff parHime, temporary. or subcontract workers, who usually are
not subject to employment protection laws and are not given job guarantees by their employers.
Japanese companies are perhaps best known for their core versus peripheral" employment strategies.
M

However, the use of temporary and parHime workers, in part to increase employment fleXibility, is
widespread in all countries.
The use of temporary and parHime workers has grown in vinually all industrialized countries
in recent years, and evidence suggests that at least some of the growth may be attributed to employer
demand for these types of workers. The .growth in temporary employment has been particularly
dramatic in certain European countries that have strong employment prmection laws but that recently
relaxed restrictions on the use of fixed·{erm contracts. In Spain, for example, the share of employees
12

in temporary jobs increased from 16 percent in 1987 to 32 percent in 1991; in France the share of
employees in temporary jobs grew from 3 percent in 1983 to 10 percent in 1991 (Commission of the
European Communities 1993, p. 181).
In Japan the share of paid employment that is temporary has remained fairly stable in recent
years at about 11 percent. Studies using aggregate industry data show that the responsiveness of
temporary employment to output changes is much greater than that of regular employment in Japan,
suggesting that temporary workers playa role in buffering regular workers from demand fluctuations
(Hashimoto 1990; Houseman and Osawa 1994).
There is little information on temporary workers hired directly by companies in the United
States. Employment in the help supply services industry. which is composed primarily of workers in
temporary help agencies, has grown rapidly in recent years, albeit from a small base. From 1982 to
1993 employment in the help supply services industry increased from about 0.5 percent to 1.5 percent
of non-farm payroll employment in the United States. Employment of temporary workers is much
more cyclically sensitive than is aggregate employment, indicating that temporary workers help to
buffer regular workers from fluctuations in demand in the United States as well.
Employers also may have incentives to increase their hiring of part-time workers to lower labor
costs and increase employment flexibility. Part-time workers, who usually receive fewer fringe
benefits than full-time workers, often are exempted from social security and other payroll taxes. 7 In
addition, part-time workers may be exempted from employment protection laws. A 1985 survey of 72
large finns in the United Kingdom found that 90 percent recently had changed their staffing strategies
to increase numerical employment flexibili£y . Three-quarters of the finns surveyed increased their use
of part-time workers and 42 percent increased their use of temporary workers. 8 In Japan, where the

7For a discussion of this issue see Houseman (1994) .
sFor a discussion of the study's results , see OECD (1986) p. 1"15 .
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share of employment that is part-time has grown dramatically from 11 percent in 1982 to 16 percent in

1992, part-time workers. along with temporary workers. have been used to help buffer regular workers
from fluctuations in demand. 9

IV.

Empirical Evidence on Employment Adjustment
As seen in the above discussion. very different labor adjustment strategies exist across

countries. In the United SEates, it is relatively easy to dismiss workers. In Europe and Japan,
employment protection laws make it more difficult or costly to dismiss even blue-collar workers.
Companies in these countries make greater use of other mechanisms to adjust labor input to fluctuations
in demand. Although employment protection laws make layoffs more costly for companies. certain
government programs in Europe and Japan help subsidize the cost of using alternatives to layoffs .
Short-time compensation programs in European countries and Japan subsidize work-sharing schemes,
and most European countries have implemented programs to subsidize early retirement as a mechanism
to avert layoffs . In addition, temporary and part-time workers, who do not receive the same
employment protection by law or job guarantees from companies, are widely used in Japan to increase
employment flexibility . The use of temporary workers has increased in European countries where
regulation of flXed-tenn contracts has been relaxed.
What effects do the different adjustment strategies have on the operation of the labor market?
If employment protection laws are very costly to companies, one might expect that they would inhibit
companies from hiring new workers, thereby raising unemployment. However, the existence of
government programs that subsidize alternatives to layoff. such as short-time work and early
retirement. should reduce companies' costs of adjusting labor and thus mitigate any adverse

9For documentation of this fact see Houseman and Osawa (1994).
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employment effects. One also would expect that employment protection laws would result in sluggish
adjustment of employment levels to demand changes. Although one might expect slower adjustment of
employment levels in countries with stronger employment protection laws, it does not necessarily
follow that adjustment of total labor input is slower. We might expect adjustment of average hours per
worker to be greater in these countries, both because of the higher costs of adjusting employment levels
and because of the existence of short-time compensation programs.
The conclusions of studies that have examined the effects of employment protection laws on
unemployment have been mixed. In a cross-country comparison Lazear (1990) found a positive
relationship between the level of mandatory severance pay and a country's unemployment rate,
controlling for other factors. One OECD study concluded, however, that little is known about the
relationship between employment protection laws and unemployment, citing the fact that countries with
the most

~efficient~

labor markets include both highly regulated economies, such as Germany, and

highly unregulated economies, such as the United States. 10
Some srudies have looked for the effect of changes in employment protection laws on changes
in the patterns of employment and hours adjustment within a country. Nickell (1979) examined the
impact of the strengthening of employment protection laws in the United Kingdom. He found that
while the responsiveness of employment to output changes slowed, the responsiveness of average hours
to output increased over time, a fact that he attributed to more stringent employment protection laws.
Another srudy looked at the effects of changes in employment protection laws in France, Germany. and
Belgium on employment and hours adjustment and found little evidence to suggest that these changes
substantially affected adjustment practices (Abraham and Houseman 1994).

IiJSee OEeD (1986) p. 123 . The study also counted Japan as an efficient, unregulated market.
As noted above, although Japan's employment protection laws are not particularly stringent by
European standards, case law in Japan has made it extremely difficult to layoff regular workers.
IS

Several studies have compared the adjustment of employment and hours in response to demand
changes across countries. Collectively these studies show that the adjustment of employment levels to
demand shocks in European countries and in Japan is significantly slower than that in the United
States. 11 In a comparison of employment adjustment in selected European countries, Japan, Canada,
and the United States, Hotz-Hart (1987) found that employment adjustment is faster in France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom than it is in Japan, but that employment adjustment is significantly
slower in these European countries than in Canada and the United States. 12
These findings on the relative speeds of employment adjustment in Europe, Japan, and the
United States are not surprising. The interesting empirical issue is whether European and Japanese
companies compensate for the slower employment adjustment by adjusting average hours per worker
more. Empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. One study of the Gennan, French and U.S. steel
industries found that the adjustment of average hours in Germany and France usually did not fully
compensate for the lack of employment adjustment, and thus that the adjustment of total hours
adjustment was generally less in these countries than in the: United Slates (Houseman, 1988). A study
of the Gennan and American automobile industry. however, found onJy slightly slower total hours
adjustment in Germany than in the United Slates (Kohler and Sengenberger, 1983). Two studies of
adjustment in eleven manufacturing industries in Germany and the United States, found that crosscountry differences in total hours adjustment were insignificantly different in most industries (Abraham
and Houseman 1993, Houseman and Abraham 1995). Another comparison of adjustment in

IIStudies containing comparisons of employment adjustment between the United States and
European countries include Kohler and Sengenberger (1983), Mairesse and Donnont (1985),
Houseman (1988), Abraham and Houseman (1993), Abraham and Houseman (1994)! and Houseman
and Abraham (1995) . Studies containing comparisons of employment adjustment between the United
States and Japan include Hashimoto and Raisin (1988), Abraham and Houseman (1989), and
Hashimoto (1990) .
12The Hotz-Hart results are reproduced in Sengenberger (1992).
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manufacturing industries in Gennany, Belgium, and the United States, found that while total hours
adjustment was greater in the United States than in Germany and Belgium for aggregate manufacturing,
cross-country differences in adjustment were small in most industries, suggesting that the results for
aggregate manufacturing were being driven by the sluggish adjustment in selected industries (Abraham
and Houseman 1994).
Studies have generally found that both employment and total hours adjustment is significantly
slower in Japan than in other industrialized countries. In comparing adjustment in Japan and the United
States, Hashimoto and Raisin (1988) and Abraham and Houseman (1989) found significantly slower
adjustment oftOlal hours in Japan. Van Audenrode (l994) found substantially slower adjustment of
total hours in Japan compared with that in the United Slates and several European countries.
To illustrate differences in employment and hours adjustment patterns across countries, I
present some estimated elasticities of production employment, average production worker hours, and
total production worker hours with respect to output for German, Japanese and U.S. manufacturing.
These elasticities are estimated using the following fmite distributed lag model:
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where L represents production employment, average production worker hours, or total production
worker hours; S is deflated shipments; t is a time trend term; and

E.

is an error tenn, which is assumed

to follow a first-{)rder autoregressive process. I use quarterly data to estimate these equations, and thus
the models allow for shipments to affect labor input with a lag of up to one year. For example, the
sum of

~o

(0

~4

captures the cumulative effect over a year of a one time change in shipments on

employment or hours . All data are seasonally adjusted. 13

ilThe Gennan data on production employment, production hours , and shipments come from a
monthly employer survey conducted by the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt).
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Table 2 reports the results of these employment and hours elasticities for German, Japanese ,
and U.S. manufacturing over the 1973-90 period. The current quarter employment elasticity estimate

for the United States, for example, implies that a one percent reduction in shipments would lead to a
.560 percent reduction in employment in the quarter contemporaneous to the output shock. Assuming
the shock to shipments persists, the estimates imply that a one percent reduction in shipments would
result in a 1.033 percent decline in employment four quarters following the initial shock in the United
States.
The adjustment of employment is much grealer in the United States than that in either Germany
or Japan across all time horizons . The current quarter elasticity estimate is .560 for the United States
compared to .038 for Gennany and .032 for Japan. Even after four quarters, the employment elasticity
for the United States (1.033) is much greater than that for Gennany or Japan (.390 and .296,
respectively) .
The results also suggest that, at least inunediately following a shock to shipments, average
hours are more responsive to changes in output in Germany and Japan than in the United States,
although this greater average hours adjustment does not fully compensate for the lack of employment
adjustrnent. For aggregate manufacturing the adjustment of total labor input is slower in Germany and
Japan than in the United States. As noted above, however, research suggests that the adjustment of
total hours is not significantly different in Gennany and the United States for a majority of
manufacturing industries.

Japanese production hou rs data come from a monthly employer survey conducted by the Ministry of
Labor. Because of problems with the Japanese employment series, we used access ions and separations
data from the same survey to construct an employment series over the period . The Japanese labor data
are for establishments with 30 or more workers. The Japanese shipments data is an index constructed
by MITI. U.S. production employment and production hours data come from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics' monthly Employment, Payroll , and Hours survey and U.S. shipments data come from (he
Bureau of Census 's Manufacturers' Shipments, Inventories, and Orders data set. More detailed
descript ions of the data used here may be found in Abraham and Houseman (1989, 1993).
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Table 2
Employment and Hours Adjustment in U.S., German, and Japanese Manufacturing, 1973-90"

Current

One
Quarter

Two Quarters

Three
Quarters

Four Quarters

u.s.

0.560
(0.045)

0.869
(0.052)

0.984
(0.059)

1.046
(0.063)

1.033
(0.067)

Germany

0.038
(0.022)

0.114
(0.040)

0.215
(0.055)

0.320
(0.068)

0.390
(0.077)

Japan

0.032
(0.034)

0.132
(0.037)

0.200
(0.040)

0.257
(0.041)

0.296
(0.044)

u.s.

0.218 ·
(0.033)

0.241
(0 .037)

0.194
(0.041)

0.149
(0.044)

0.071
(0.044)

Gennany

0.308
(0.038)

0.304
(0.061)

0.221
(0.076)

0.205
(0083)

0.175
(0.090)

Japan

0.290
(0.085)

0.203
(0.093)

0.088
(0.100)

-B.051
(0.103)

-B. 146
(0.109)

u.s.

0.786
(0.061)

1.123
(0.069)

1.191
(0.078)

1.212
(0.083)

1.124
(0.086)

Gennany

0.372
(0.042)

0.481
(0.073)

0.545
(0.098)

0.681
(0.116)

0.760
(0 .130)

Japan

0.329
(0.076)

0.342
(0 .082)

0.293
(0.087)

0.206
(0.088)

0.142
(0 .091)

• Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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The extremely sluggish employment adjusunent in Japan masks significant differences in
employment adjusunent across groups of workers. The employment elasticity for female production
workers is substantially greater than that for male production workers in Japanese manufacturing,
reflecting the fact that women are disproportionately represented among part-time and temporary
workers, who have little job security in Japan (Houseman and Abraham. 1993). Figure 1, which plots
the logarithm of production, regular employment and temporary employment in Japanese
manufacturing. illustrates the greater responsiveness of temporary employment to output changes
compared to that of regular employment. Temporary employment declined sharply during the deep
recession in the mid-1970's and increased sharply during the subsequent recovery. During the most
recent recession temporary employment has trended downward. In contrast. regular employment
displayed little fluctuation throughout the period.
Several studies have shown that liberal short-time compensation programs play an important
role in facilitating hours adjustment in lieu of layoffs and thereby in mitigating the adverse effects of
employment protection laws (Abraham and Houseman 1993, 1994, Van Audenrode. 1994). Figure 2,
which depicts the percent of workers in industry in the fonner West Gennany on short time over the
1970-89 period, is suggestive of the importance of short-time work in the adjustment process in that
country. During good years, few workers are on short time. During the recessions in 1974 and 1983.
the share of workers on short time rose to about 7 percent. More fonnal analysis shows that the
fluctuation in short-time hours accounts for over half of the initial adjustment of total production
worker hours to changes in output in the Gennan manufacturing sector (Abraham and Houseman
1993).
More generally, countries with stringent employment protection laws often have programs that
lower (he cost to companies of adjusting labor using alternatives to layoffs, such as shorHime
compensation and early retirement. A recent study by the European Conunission found a strong
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Figure 1

Production, Regular Employment and Temporary
Employment in Japanese Manufacturing
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positive correlation between the stringency of employment protection laws and public expenditures to
support employment adjustmem among the four largest member states (France, Gennany, Italy, and the
United Kingdom). Expenditures on employment adjustment measures in France exceeded 2 percent of
gross domestic product (GOP) over the 1985-88 period. France made particularly large expenditures
in support of enterprises undergoing restructuring, primarily in the fonn of support for early
retirement. At the other extreme, expenditures on employment adjustment measures over this period
were just 0.5 percent of GOP in the United Kingdom, which has no program to support short-time
working. The report concluded that "the patterns of labour market expenditure in the four largest
Member States tend to indicate that the constraints imposed on firms by employment protection
regulations are in large measure offset by spending on employment adjustment measures" (Commission
of the European Communities 1993, p. 183).
The effects of employment protection laws on labor adjustment may not be so neutral,
however, in countries that have few programs to assist companies to use alternatives to layoffs. The
same Commission report noted that in member countries where social protection systems are less well
developed, notably among Southern member states, stringent employment protection laws have been
justified on the grounds that companies should provide such social support by retaining workers during
downturns (Commission of the European Communities 1993, p. 184). Without accompanying
government programs to support labor adjustment, however, such laws are likely to reduce labor
market flexibility, inhibit the hiring of regular workers, and thus raise unemployment or increase the
employment of casual workers not covered by protective legislation.

V.

Conclusion
The mechanisms [hal companies use to adjust labor inpul

10

slack demand and to the

introduction of new technologies differ substantially across countries. Companies in countries such as
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the United States and the United Kingdom typically rely extensively on layoffs to reduce labor input.
In contrast, companies in other European countries and in Japan rely much more on short-time work,
attrition, early retirement, internal transfers, and layoffs among peripheral workers to effect labor
reductions.
Il is often preswned that government policy is largely responsible for differences in adjustment
strategies across countries. Employment protection laws, for example, are widely asswned to constrain
employer behavior. However, it is likely that such government regulation frequently represents the
codification of what is generally regarded by the private sector as best practice. 14
Even if government policies by themselves do not cause the large differences in adjustment
practices that we observe across countries, they certainly reinforce these differences. Legal restrictions
on dismissal make it more difficult and costly to adjust through layoffs in some European countries and
Japan than in the United States. Conversely, short-time compensation programs and subsidies for early
retirement make it more attractive for companies in some European countries and in Japan to use
alternatives to layoffs .
There is little agreement among economists and policymakers concerning the relative efficiency
of the various labor market regulations and associated adjustment strategies. While some argue that any
government regulation of dismissals results in economic distortions that reduce labor market efficiency,
others argue that market imperfections result in too many layoffs and justify some government
intervention. Il is likely that regulations in some countries have been excessive and have adversely
affected the operation of the labor market. Some European countries have heavily regulated dismissals
without providing programs to assist companies adjust through alternatives to layoff. Such policies
may have contributed to high unemployment and the rapid growth of temporary and part-time

14For example, in one study (Abraham and Houseman 1993) we show that even before major
rest rictions were placed on mass layoffs in Gennany, employment adjustment was extremely sluggish .
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employment in these countries. However, studies have shown that in at least some European countries
in which policies to promote alternatives to layoff, such as shon-time work, accompany regulation of
dismissals, greater adjustment of average hours per worker in the shon run largely compensates for
slower adjustment of employment, and companies in these European countries adjust total labor input
about as quickly as those in the United States.
Moreover, companies may realize certain long-run benefits by providing their worJcforce with
strong job security. Companies that offer strong job security are likely to benefit from a more stable
workforce and experience lower turnover costs. Companies may also meet less resistance to the
introduction of new technologies if their workers do not feel their jobs are jeopardized by the change.
Finally. although a discussion of internal labor markets is beyond the scope of the present paper. it
should be noted that a number of researchers have argued that in certain countries, including Germany
and Japan, strong job security has facilitated the development of a more flexible internal labor market.
characterized by broad job categories, a broadly trained worJcforce, and hence easy redeployment of
workers within the firm. Such internal labor market flexibility, it is argued, enables companies to
respond more effectively to changes in product demand and technology. I ~

ISFor discussions of crOSS-COUnlry differences in internal labor market flexibility , see Koike
(1983), OECD (1986), Osterman (1988) , Clarke (1992) , and Sengenberger (1992),
2S
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